Brackets: A Historical Perspective by Roberts, Tracey M.
Copyright  2014  by  Tracey  M.  Roberts Printed  in  U.S.A. 
 Vol.  108,  No.  3 
925 
BRACKETS: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
Tracey M. Roberts 
ABSTRACT—This Article surveys the history of the U.S. income tax 
system from 1913 to the present, examining changes in the structure of the 
graduated rates system over the past 100 years, using inflation-adjusted 
dollars. By connecting these changes to key events in the history of the 
United States, the Article contextualizes modifications Congress has made 
to the income tax over time as well as the current debate surrounding 
several proposals for reform. First, the Article demonstrates that the rate 
structure has become more flat (with lower rates and fewer brackets than in 
the past), compressed (with less graduation, steeper jumps between 
brackets, and less penetration of the rate schedule into the income strata), 
and complex (with the proliferation of tax expenditures) over time. Second, 
the Article reveals that the structures that would result from two of the tax 
reform proposals being discussed in the popular media resemble historical 
rates and brackets. Because these proposals for tax reform have analogs in 
earlier versions of the income tax, the Article argues that analysis of 
economic data from prior periods may help inform tax policy and identifies 
an agenda for future research. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The U.S. Income Tax celebrated its 100th anniversary in 2013. It is 
customary under such circumstances to revisit significant events in the 
history of an institution and to provide some context for the changes that 
have occurred over time. This Article is descriptive; it examines and 
compares the rate structures in effect during the past one hundred years, 
using inflation-adjusted dollars, and depicts these changes in graphic 
format. Part I describes the compression and flattening of the progressive 
rate structure. It describes the changes in the top and bottom marginal rates 
for ordinary income, the personal exemption and standard deduction, and 
the number of brackets and their progression into the income strata, noting 
that the bracket structure has become flatter, more compressed, more 
complex, and less transparent over time. This Part also contextualizes the 
major modifications in the rate structures by connecting them to key events 
in the history of the country. Part II notes the resemblance between 
historical rate structures and those that would result from implementation 
of two current proposals for reform, outlining recent empirical research on 
progressive rate structures based on historical data. It then examines the 
“millionaire surtax” in light of analogous tax rate structures from the 
history of the income tax. The Article then concludes, describing an agenda 
for further study. 
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I. THE COMPRESSION AND FLATTENING OF THE  
PROGRESSIVE RATES STRUCTURE 
A. Nominal Versus Inflation-Adjusted Brackets 
The income tax is progressive; higher tax rates are imposed on higher1 
levels of an individual’s income. To calculate taxable income, we identify 
an individual’s adjusted gross income,2 subtract the standard deduction (or 
itemized deductions, subject to certain limitations)3 and the personal 
exemption.4 We then segregate ordinary income from capital gains and 
apply different rates to each successive traunch of ordinary income.5 
Capital gains are subject to a separate rate schedule under I.R.C. § 1(h).6 
Historically, in enacting income tax legislation, Congress has denominated 
in fixed dollar amounts the income levels to which the different tax rates 
would apply. Figure 1 sets forth in nominal dollars the taxable income 
levels to which the successive rates would be applied for 1913, 1963, and 
2013. In the 1960s the exemption amounts appear to be lower, the rates 
appear to be much higher, and there are more brackets (twenty-four 
different rates instead of seven) applied across the income spectrum.7 
 
1 In general, higher rates are applied to higher levels of income, but from 1988 to 1990 a lower rate 
(28%) was applied to the top income bracket, while the middle bracket was taxed at a higher rate 
(33%). U.S. Federal Individual Income Tax Rates History, 1862–2013 (Nominal and Inflation-Adjusted 
Brackets), TAX FOUND., http://taxfoundation.org/article/us-federal-individual-income-tax-rates-history-
1913-2013-nominal-and-inflation-adjusted-brackets (last updated Oct. 17, 2013). 
2 Adjusted gross income is reached by subtracting above-the-line deductions listed in § 62 (relating 
primarily to business expenses and other key investments made to generate income over time) from 
gross income, defined in § 61. I.R.C. §§ 61–62 (2012). 
3 Id. § 63. 
4 Id. § 151. 
5 Id. § 1. 
6 Space constraints limit the inclusion of a capital gains analysis. Most of the taxpayers that would 
be reporting capital gains are in the top quintile of income. See The Distribution of Major Tax 
Expenditures in the Individual Income Tax System, CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE (May 29, 2013), 
http://www.cbo.gov/publication/43768 (“[The] CBO estimates that more than 90 percent of the benefits 
of reduced tax rates on capital gains and dividends will accrue to households in the highest income 
quintile in 2013, with almost 70 percent going to households in the top percentile.”) See also Benjamin 
H. Harris, Capital Income by Tax Treatment, 127 TAX NOTES 573, 573 (2010) (based on a simulation 
model). For the other four quintiles, wages are the primary source of income (which are taxed at 
ordinary income rates), retirement assets are often held in tax-deferred vehicles such as IRAs and 
§ 401(k) plans (which defer tax on income saved for retirement, but charge ordinary rates on that 
income as it is drawn down), and their main capital assets are primary residences, which on sale 
currently enjoy the exclusion of the first $250,000 in capital gains for an individual and an exclusion of 
up to $500,000 in capital gains for a married couple under I.R.C. § 121. 
7 Historical Individual Income Tax Parameters, TAX POL’Y CENTER, URB. INST. & BROOKINGS 
INSTITUTION (Apr. 10, 2013), http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxfacts/displayafact.cfm?Docid=543; 
Historical Standard Deduction, TAX POL’Y CENTER, URB. INST. & BROOKINGS INSTITUTION (Apr. 1, 
2013), http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxfacts/displayafact.cfm?DocID=171&Topic2id=30&Topic3
id=39; U.S. Federal Individual Income Tax Rates History, supra note 1. 
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FIGURE 1: NOMINAL BRACKETS  
(PERSONAL EXEMPTION, STANDARD DEDUCTIONS,  
AND RATES FOR BRACKETS IN NOMINAL DOLLARS) 
Nominal 
Brackets 
1913 1963 2013 
Personal 
Exemption 
$3000 $600 $3900 
Standard 
Deduction 
N/A $60 $6100 
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Rate On Taxable 
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Rate On Taxable 
Income of 
1st Bracket  1% $0–$20,000 20% $0–$2000 10% $0–$8925 
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Nominal brackets mask some of the dramatic changes that have been 
made to the bracket structures, however, because they do not account for 
inflation. When the dollar amounts for the brackets,8 the standard 
deduction9 and the personal exemption10 are adjusted for inflation,11 
comparisons can be made between these parameters over the one-hundred-




8 Nominal brackets for the calendar years 1913 through 2013 were obtained from the Tax 
Foundation. See U.S. Federal Individual Income Tax Rates History, supra note 1. The nominal brackets 
were then adjusted for inflation to reflect 2013 dollars based on the average Consumer Price Index for 
All Urban Consumers (CPI-U) published by the Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics for 
each year. The consumer price index represents changes in prices of all goods and services purchased 
for consumption by urban households. The CPI-U index value has been calculated every year since 
1913. See generally BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, BLS HANDBOOK OF 
METHODS ch. 17 (2007), available at http://www.bls.gov/opub/hom/pdf/homch17.pdf (providing a 
detailed overview of the Consumer Price Index). An inflation calculator is available from the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics. See CPI Inflation Calculator, BUREAU LAB. STATS., U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., 
http://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm (last visited June 1, 2014). Since the initial research 
was performed, the Tax Foundation has posted its own set of inflation-adjusted brackets using other 
methodologies. 
9 In 1944, when the standard deduction was introduced, it was set at 10% of adjusted gross income 
up to a maximum of $1000. Individual Income Tax Act of 1944, Pub. L. No. 315, § 9, 58 Stat. 231, 236. 
In 1964, Congress introduced a minimum standard deduction of $200 plus $100 for each exemption, up 
to a maximum of $1000. Revenue Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-272, §141(a), (c), 78 Stat. 19, 23. The 
historical values for the standard deduction from 1970 through 2013 were obtained from the Tax Policy 
Center and adjusted for inflation throughout the Article to reflect 2013 dollars based on the average 
CPI-U published by the Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics for each year. CPI Inflation 
Calculator, supra note 8; Historical Standard Deduction, supra note 7. 
10 The historical values for the personal exemption were obtained from the Tax Policy Center and 
adjusted for inflation throughout the Article to reflect 2013 dollars based on the average CPI-U for each 
year published by the Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics. CPI Inflation Calculator, supra 
note 8; Historical Individual Income Tax Parameters, supra note 7. 
11 Many methods may be used to adjust for inflation. See Jim Chen, The Price of Macroeconomic 
Imprecision: How Should the Law Measure Inflation?, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1375, 1403–29 (2003) 
(describing the strengths, weaknesses, and differences between the Consumer Price Index published by 
the Department of Labor Bureau of Labor Statistics and the Implicit Price Deflator published by the 
Department of Commerce Bureau of Economic Analysis). However, Congress has, by statute, 
specifically authorized the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to use the CPI-U to index the income tax 
brackets for inflation. See I.R.C. § 1(f)(5). The  Internal Revenue Code does authorize other indices for 
other inflation adjustments. See Chen, supra, at 1406–07. For example, the Internal Revenue Code 
authorizes the use of the Implicit Price Deflator for adjusting the phaseout of tax credits for production 
of electricity for renewable energy and production of alternative fuels. Id. at 1407; see also I.R.C. 
§§ 43(b)(3)(B), 45(e)(2)(B). 
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FIGURE 2: PERSONAL EXEMPTION, STANDARD DEDUCTION, AND  




1913 1963 2013 
Personal 
Exemption $70,593 $457 $3900 
Standard 
Deduction N/A $4568 $6100 
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Rate On Taxable 
Income of 
1st Bracket  1% $0–$470,620 20% $0–$15,226 10% $0–$8925 






























8th Bracket N/A N/A 47% $106,582– $121,808 N/A N/A 
24th Bracket N/A N/A 91% Over $1,522,595 N/A N/A 
 
Using the inflation-adjusted dollars set forth in Figure 2, it becomes 
apparent that the initial income tax12 was low, relatively flat, and applied 
only to very-high-income taxpayers. The first $3000 of gross income, 
approximately $70,600 in 2013 dollars, were exempt. The legislation 
imposed a “normal” tax of 1% on taxable incomes of up to $20,000 (or 
$470,620 in 2013 dollars), and an additional “surtax” at graduated rates of 
1% to 6% on higher levels of income.13 This seven-bracket progressive rate 
structure extended very far into the income spectrum, with the top rate of 
 
12 Act of Oct. 3, 1913, Pub. L. No. 63-16, § 2, 38 Stat. 114, 166–81. 
13 JOHN F. WITTE, THE POLITICS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 78 (1985). 
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7% applied to taxable income in excess of $500,000 (or $11,765,505 in 
2013 dollars). 
By 1963, the mid-century mark, however, the income tax had 
transformed from a “class tax” to a “mass tax” with a significantly broader 
base.14 The personal exemption, to which a standard deduction had been 
added, exempted the first $660 in income from taxation, the equivalent of 
$5025 in 2013 dollars. The rate structure had also become far more 
progressive, applying twenty-four different rates across the income strata, 
beginning with a steep bottom rate of 20% applied to taxable income up to 
$2000 ($15,226 in 2013 dollars). The top rate of 91% was applied to 
income above $200,000 ($1,522,595 in 2013 dollars). 
In 2013, the standard deduction and the personal exemption excluded 
the first $10,000 of gross income. Seven brackets, 10%, 15%, 25%, 28%, 
33%, 35%, and 39.6% were applied to successive traunches of income, 
with the 10% bottom rate applied to taxable incomes up to $8925, and a top 
rate of 39.6% applied to taxable income above $400,000 in 2013 dollars. 
The three different rate structures are depicted in Figure 3, to facilitate 
comparison.15 
 
14 STEVEN A. BANK, KIRK J. STARK & JOSEPH J. THORNDIKE, WAR AND TAXES, at xiv, xix n.12 
(2008) [hereinafter BANK ET AL.] (citing Carolyn C. Jones, Class Tax to Mass Tax: The Role of 
Propaganda in the Expansion of the Income Tax During World War II, 37 BUFF. L. REV. 685, 686 
(1989)). 
15 There are a number of simplifying assumptions that have been applied throughout this Article to 
promote comparison, to ensure consistent treatment of the tax parameters over time, and to facilitate 
graphing the changes in the parameters. First, the Article focuses on taxpayers filing as unmarried 
individuals. Initially, each individual was liable for tax on his or her own income tax without respect to 
whether the person was single, married, or the head of a household. Today, the progressive rates are 
applied to different levels of income based on a taxpayer’s filing status as an unmarried individual, a 
married couple filing jointly, a married couple filing separately, or an unmarried individual acting as the 
head of a household. U.S. Federal Individual Income Tax Rates History, supra note 1. Second, in 
depicting the bracket structures in Figure 3, the Article assumes that above-the-line deductions have 
already been taken into account to calculate adjusted gross income. Third, for Figure 3 and Figure 10, 
infra, the Article assumes that the standard deduction is taken, since less than 30% of taxpayers itemize. 
See Benjamin H. Harris & Daniel Baneman, Who Itemizes Deductions?, 130 TAX NOTES 345, 345 
(2011). Finally, the phase-outs for the personal exemption under I.R.C. § 151 are ignored, the 
Alternative Minimum Tax under I.R.C. § 55 is not taken into account, and credits are not applied. 
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FIGURE 3: BRACKET STRUCTURES FROM 1913, 1963, AND 2013  
APPLIED TO ADJUSTED GROSS INCOME IN 2013 DOLLARS (THOUSANDS) 
 
During the first half century, the income tax structure transformed 
from a relatively low and very modestly progressive tax levied only on the 
wealthiest classes to a broad-based tax that included virtually all wage 
earners and imposed highly progressive rates across the income spectrum. 
During the last half century, however, the rate progression has contracted 
significantly, with the income tax becoming more flat and the bracket 
structure becoming more compressed. The following sections clarify these 
trends by focusing on the following tax parameters: the changes in the top 
and bottom rates on ordinary income, the capital gains rate, the zero rate 
(the amount of income on which no income tax is paid due to the personal 
exemption and standard deduction), the number of brackets, and the 
income levels at which the top and bottom rates were applied. These 
sections also connect changes in the parameters to key events in the history 
of the United States over this period. 
B. Changes in Rates on Ordinary Income and Capital Gains 
The first parameter to examine is the rates themselves. Figure 4 
depicts the top and bottom marginal rates for an unmarried individual over 
the 100-year period the income tax has been in force.16 
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FIGURE 4: TOP AND BOTTOM MARGINAL TAX RATES 1913–2013 
 
The top marginal tax rate provides some indication of the degree to 
which the income tax has varied over time. Initially the income tax was a 
“class tax”;17 the rates were very modest and applied only to households 
with the highest incomes, impacting only 2% of the population.18 As 
mentioned above, the first income tax statute provided for a seven-bracket 
structure of gradually increasing rates starting at 1% and extending to 7%, 
and was levied on only the highest income taxpayers.19 The days of low 
rates and high exemptions were short lived, however. The United States 
soon prepared to enter World War I and Congress raised income tax rates 
 
17 BANK ET AL., supra note 14, at xiv. 
18 Id. at 52; WITTE, supra note 13. 











































N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
934 
sharply to increase revenues for military mobilization.20 By 1918, the top 
marginal rate was 77%.21 
After World War I, when the postwar economic boom of the “Roaring 
Twenties” had yielded budget surpluses,22 Congress reduced rates,23 with 
the top rate of 25% levied on taxable incomes of $100,000 (approximately 
$1.31 million in 2013 dollars) or more.24 The 1929 stock market crash 
heralded the onset of the Great Depression; bank failures, price deflation, 
unemployment, foreclosures, and a 50% drop in industrial output25 reduced 
 
20 Congress passed the Revenue Act of 1916 in preparation to enter the war. BANK ET AL., supra 
note 14, at 53–55. The Act cut the personal exemption by half, increased the number of brackets to 
fourteen, brought up the bottom rate to 2%, and doubled the top rate, imposing a tax of 15% on incomes 
over $42,744,404 (in 2013 dollars). See Revenue Act of 1916, Pub. L. No. 64-271, § 1(a)–(b), 39 Stat. 
756, 756–57; BANK ET AL., supra note 14, at 54; Historical Individual Income Tax Parameters, supra 
note 7; U.S. Federal Individual Income Tax Rates History, supra note 1. When the U.S. actually entered 
World War I in 1917, Congress again raised income tax rates sharply, increasing the number of brackets 
from seven to fifty-six, with the top marginal rate set as high as 67%, and reducing the personal 
exemption from $3000 (approximately $64,117 in 2013 dollars) to $1000 (approximately $18,200 in 
2013 dollars). See War Revenue Act, Pub. L. No. 65-50, § 3, 40 Stat. 300, 301 (1917); BANK ET AL., 
supra note 14, at 57–68. In 1918, finding that the revenues were short of the sums needed to fund the 
war, Congress again increased rates, bringing the top marginal rate to 77%, applied to incomes in 
excess of $1 million ($15,427,616 in 2013 dollars). See Revenue Act of 1918, Pub. L. No. 65-254, 
§ 211(a), 40 Stat. 1057, 1064–65; BANK ET AL., supra note 14, at 69–79. 
21 Revenue Act of 1918, Pub. L. No. 65-254, § 211(a), 40 Stat. 1057, 1064–65. 
22 In 1921, President Warren Harding appointed Andrew Mellon, the Pittsburgh banker and 
industrial magnate, one of the wealthiest men in the country, as Secretary of the Treasury. JOSEPH J. 
THORNDIKE, THEIR FAIR SHARE: TAXING THE RICH IN THE AGE OF FDR 12 (2013); WITTE, supra 
note 13, at 88. Mellon reduced top rates from wartime highs, acting upon the view espoused in his 
book, Taxation: The People’s Business, that high taxes led to tax evasion or avoidance and had a 
negative impact on labor supply by undermining incentives to work. WITTE, supra note 13, at 89; see 
also ANDREW W. MELLON, TAXATION: THE PEOPLE’S BUSINESS 12–13 (1924). Mellon was a fiscal 
conservative; he reduced taxes throughout the 1920s because the country had experienced actual budget 
surpluses after World War I. See BANK ET AL., supra note 14, at 81. 
23 WITTE, supra note 13 at 91–93; see The Revenue Act of 1921, Pub. L. No. 67-98, 42 Stat. 227. 
The Revenue Act of 1921 reduced the top marginal rate from 73% to 58%, charged on incomes of 
$200,000 or more (approximately $2.77 million in 2013 dollars). 42 Stat. at 233, 237; U.S. Federal 
Individual Income Tax Rates History, supra note 1. The Revenue Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-176, 
43 Stat. 253, reduced both normal rates and surtaxes, bringing the number of brackets down to forty-
three and reducing the highest marginal tax rate to 46%, which was charged on incomes of $500,000 or 
more (approximately $6.8 million in 2013 dollars). By 1925, the top rate, 25%, was levied on incomes 
in excess of $100,000 (approximately $1.3 million in 2013 dollars). The bottom rate was reduced to 
2%, charged on incomes up to $4000 (approximately $53,250 in 2013 dollars). 43 Stat. at 264–67; U.S. 
Federal Individual Income Tax Rates History, supra note 1. The exemption increased from $1000 
(approximately $13,600 in 2013 dollars) in 1924 to $1500 (approximately $20,000 in 2013 dollars) in 
1925. Historical Individual Income Tax Parameters, supra note 7; 43 Stat. at 272. 
24 The Revenue Act of 1926 lowered the bottom marginal rate to 1.5%, to be applied to incomes of 
$4000 or less (approximately $52,600 in 2013 dollars); the top marginal rate of 25% was applied to 
incomes as high as $1.5 million or more. Revenue Act of 1926, Pub. L. No. 69-20, § 210(a), 44 Stat. 9, 
21. This twenty-three-bracket rate structure was maintained through 1931. U.S. Federal Individual 
Income Tax Rates History, supra note 1. 
25 HOWARD ZINN, A PEOPLE’S HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 386–93 (1999). 
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tax revenues significantly.26 Within two years the earlier surpluses had 
turned into massive deficits.27 Congress restored income tax rates to their 
immediate postwar levels,28 setting the top marginal rate at 63%.29 President 
Franklin Roosevelt was initially hesitant to raise rates further,30 but by 1934 
he argued that the revenue system had “done little to prevent an unjust 
concentration of wealth and economic power.”31 He pushed Congress to 
reverse that concentration with the Revenue Act of 1935,32 bringing the top 
rate to 79%. With the onset of World War II, Congress increased rates each 
year to support military mobilization, cover the costs of war, and suppress 
inflation.33 The top marginal rate reached its apex at 94% in 1944.34 
In the first decade and a half following the war, Presidents Harry 
Truman and Dwight D. Eisenhower struggled with Congress to keep taxes 
high; their goals were to combat inflation, repay the war debt, balance the 
budget, and cover the costs of Cold War conflicts.35 They opposed and 
periodically vetoed revenue acts that reduced rates significantly or 
benefited the wealthy preferentially.36 To override Truman’s vetoes, 
Congress constructed the requisite majority by offering tax benefits to 
 
26 THORNDIKE, supra note 22, at 30. 
27 Id. at 33. 
28 When postwar budget surpluses turned into massive deficits with the deepening of the Great 
Depression, Secretary of the Treasury Andrew Mellon reversed course, overseeing sharp increases in 
marginal income tax rates, reversing the tax cuts he had spearheaded during the prior decade. WITTE, 
supra note 13, at 96. 
29 The Revenue Act of 1932 returned the income tax to the fifty-six-bracket structure, with the 
lowest marginal tax rate, 4%, charged on incomes up to $4000 (approximately $68,000 in 2013 dollars) 
and the highest marginal tax rate, 63%, charged on incomes in excess of $1 million (approximately 
$17 million in 2013 dollars). The earned income tax credit was eliminated. The Revenue Act of 1932, 
Pub. L. No. 72-154, 47 Stat. 169. 
30 WITTE, supra note 13, at 100. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. at 100–02. Called by detractors the “Wealth Tax of 1935” and the “Soak the Rich Tax,” the 
Act imposed a surtax on incomes of $50,000 (approximately $838,000 in 2013 dollars) or more. BANK 
ET AL., supra note 14, at 108; THORNDIKE, supra note 22, at 131; WITTE, supra note 13, at 100–01; see 
Revenue Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-407, §101, 49 Stat. 1014, 1014–15; U.S. Federal Individual 
Income Tax Rates History, supra note 1. The Revenue Act of 1935 created a structure with thirty-three 
brackets, adding a surtax to incomes of $50,000 (approximately $838,000 in 2013 dollars). The lowest 
marginal tax rate of 4% was charged on incomes of $4000 (approximately $67,000 in 2013 dollars) or 
less, and the highest marginal tax rate, 79%, was charged on incomes of $5 million (approximately 
$83.8 million in 2013 dollars) or more. U.S. Federal Individual Income Tax Rates History, supra note 
1. The personal exemption remained at $1000 (approximately $17,000 in 2013 dollars). 49 Stat. at 
1014–15; Historical Individual Income Tax Parameters, supra note 7. 
33 BANK ET AL., supra note 14, at 95–107; WITTE, supra note 13, at 114–23. The income tax was 
used to reduce demand. By taxing wages and other income at high rates, consumers had less disposable 
income and consequently, fewer dollars were chasing limited goods. See WITTE, supra note 13, at 115. 
34 Individual Income Tax Act of 1944, Pub. L. No. 315, pt. I, sec. 3–4, § 11–12, 58 Stat. 231,  
231–32. 
35 See WITTE, supra note 13, at 133, 137, 140, 151. 
36 Id. at 133–34. 
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special interest groups,37 a process that was to be repeated regularly with 
future tax legislation, increasing the size and complexity of the income 
tax.38 With the commitment of troops to the Korean Peninsula, Congress 
reversed their rate cuts and restored a top rate of 90%.39 Following the 
Korean War, the Revenue Act of 195440 reduced rates to prewar levels and 
provided for all of the income tax statutes to be codified to manage the 
increasing complexity needed to track new forms of income, new tax units, 
income from foreign sources, and the proliferation of tax expenditures.41 
Following codification, there were no new income tax statutes for eight 
years.42 
By the mid-century mark, tax policy had shifted away from concerns 
about equal sacrifice, ability to pay, the incidence of the government 
benefits and burdens, and the importance of reducing federal deficits and 
eliminating federal debt.43 Instead, policymakers began to use the income 
tax as an economic tool to spur growth.44 President John F. Kennedy 
 
37 See id. at 134 (noting that the proposed bill offered extra exemptions for the blind and the 
elderly). 
38 Id. at 142–43. 
39 See BANK ET AL., supra note 14, at 113–14. 
40 Pub. L. No. 83-591, 68A Stat. 3 (1954). The lowest marginal rate was 20%, charged initially on 
taxable incomes of up to $2000 (approximately $17,000 in 2013 dollars). The highest marginal rate was 
91%, charged on incomes of $200,000 or more (approximately $1.7 million in 2013 dollars). 68A Stat. 
at 5. Because the nominal brackets were not indexed to inflation, however, the rate structure was subject 
to “bracket creep,” the imposition of higher rates on lower and lower levels of real income. By 1962 the 
bottom rate of 20% applied to incomes of $15,000 or less in 2013 dollars, and the top rate applied to 
incomes of $1.5 million or more in 2013 dollars.  
41 WITTE, supra note 13, at 149. Social Security, unemployment insurance, and health insurance 
were all new forms of income that required additional rules to be developed for taxing them. New 
entities, such as holding companies, closely held corporations, partnerships and tax-exempt 
organizations, required new tax rules; corporations received income from abroad and new mechanisms 
for tracking that income and levying taxes were needed. Id.; see also Mark P. Gergen, The Story of 
Subchapter K: Mark H. Johnson’s Quest, in BUSINESS TAX STORIES 207, 208, 213 (Steven A. Bank & 
Kirk J. Stark eds., 2005) (describing the need for the development of a fully theorized partnership tax to 
manage the massive shift to the partnership form by businesses seeking to avoid the excess profits tax 
during World War II and to address the subsequent games that businesses had developed to shift 
income and loss between partners, to convert ordinary income to capital gains, and to convert capital 
losses to ordinary losses). 
42 Id. at 150. 
43 While Kennedy had initially, like his predecessors, argued in favor of a balanced budget, he 
settled for avoiding deficit growth. David Greenberg, Tax Cuts in Camelot?, SLATE (Jan. 16, 2004, 
11:00 AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/history_lesson/2004/01/tax_cuts_in_
camelot.html (“At first Kennedy balked at [Chief Economist Walter] Heller’s Keynesianism [and 
proposal of a tax cut to spur demand]. He even proposed a balanced budget in his first State of the 
Union address. But Heller and his team won over the president. By mid-1962 Kennedy had seen the 
Keynesian light, and in January 1963 he declared that ‘the enactment this year of tax reduction and tax 
reform overshadows all other domestic issues in this Congress.’”). Kennedy agreed to run budget 
deficits so long as they did not exceed those reached during the Eisenhower era. WITTE, supra note 13, 
at 159. 
44 WITTE, supra note 13, at 159. 
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proposed tax cuts to increase demand,45 and President Johnson delivered 
them, in part to garner support for his Great Society programs.46 The 
Revenue Act of 1964 reduced rates significantly, bringing the top rate 
down from 90% to 70%.47 The next decade and a half, there were few 
significant modifications to the income tax rate structures.48 
In 1981, under the Reagan Administration, income tax rates were 
reduced dramatically again, with the top rate dropped from 70% to 50% 
under the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA).49 ERTA also 
authorized Treasury to index the brackets for inflation.50 The Tax Reform 
Act of 1986 then, over the course of five years, brought top marginal rates 
down further, taxing income between approximately $35,000 and $86,000 
and incomes over $176,000 (all in 2013 dollars) at a marginal rate of 
28%.51 The reduction in rates during the Reagan Administration sharply 
 
45 Greenberg, supra note 43 (“After his election, his advisors, led by chief economist Walter Heller, 
urged a classically Keynesian solution: running a deficit to stimulate growth. . . . In Keynesian theory, a 
tax cut aimed at consumers would have a ‘multiplier’ effect, since each dollar that a taxpayer spent 
would go to another taxpayer, who would in effect spend it again—meaning the deficit would be short-
lived.”). 
46 BANK ET AL., supra note 14, at 128. Even as U.S. military involvement escalated in Vietnam, 
Johnson resisted requesting tax increases to cover the additional costs of the Vietnam War, because he 
felt that this might undermine his “Great Society” programs, requiring the public to choose between 
“guns” and “butter.” Johnson was correct; when he ultimately did make the necessary request, the tax 
increase is thought to have compromised both the war effort and his social programs. Id. at 126, 136. 
47 Revenue Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-272, § 111(a), 78 Stat. 19, 21. Initially, the twenty-five-
bracket structure had a bottom rate of 16% charged on incomes of $3700 or less (in 2013 dollars) and a 
top rate of 77% charged on incomes of $1.48 million or more. In 1965, the bottom rate changed to 14%, 
levied on incomes of $3600 or less (in 2013 dollars), and the top rate—set at 70%—was levied on 
incomes initially of $728,000. By 1972, the 14% rate was charged on incomes of $2700 or less and the 
highest rate, 70%, was levied on incomes of $549,000 or more. U.S. Federal Individual Income Tax 
Rates History, supra note 1. 
48 See U.S. Federal Individual Income Tax Rates History, supra note 1 (noting that the brackets and 
rate structures remain the same during this period). During this period Congress most frequently used 
tax expenditures to reduce the impact of inflation and the high marginal rates, such as with the Tax 
Reform Act of 1969, or to stimulate the economy, as with the Tax Reduction Act of 1971. See WITTE, 
supra note 13, at 165–220. The impacts of inflation during this period and the changes that resulted 
from indexing the brackets to inflation in 1981 are discussed in detail infra at Part II.D. 
49 Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA), Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 101, 95 Stat. 172, 179. 
50 ERTA, § 104, 95 Stat. at 188–90; see also W. ELLIOTT BROWNLEE, FEDERAL TAXATION IN 
AMERICA: A SHORT HISTORY 150 (2d ed. 2004) (noting that although ERTA was passed in 1981, 
indexing was not utilized until 1985).  
51 Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 101, 100 Stat. 2085, 2096; U.S. Federal 
Individual Income Tax Rates History, supra note 1. By 1988, when the Act had been fully phased in, 
there were three rates in place. The bottom marginal tax rate was increased to 15% and applied to 
incomes up to $17,850 ($35,150 in 2013 dollars), the middle marginal rate of 28% was applied to 
taxable incomes between $17,850 and $43,150 ($35,150 and approximately $85,000 in 2013 dollars). 
The structure next imposed a “bubble tax rate” of 33%, applied to income between $43,150 and 
$89,560 (approximately $85,000 and $176,400 in 2013 dollars). All income exceeding $176,400 (in 
2013 dollars) was subject to a reduced rate of 28% again. U.S. Federal Individual Income Tax Rates 
History, supra note 1. 
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increased budget deficits and contributed to the federal debt.52 During the 
Clinton administration Congress raised rates and expanded the bracket 
structures to reverse the growing deficits, setting the top rate at 39.6%.53 
This, combined with PAYGO,54 a budgetary process that required that all 
new budget proposals be revenue neutral, yielded budget surpluses.55 
In general, the highest marginal rates have corresponded with periods 
in which the U.S. has been at war or facing sharp revenue losses from 
economic recession.56 Congress diverged from this pattern57 in 2001.58 
Despite U.S. military engagement on two fronts, Afghanistan and Iraq, 
Congress reduced rates in 200159 and 2003,60 setting the top rate at 35%, 
 
52 BROWNLEE, supra note 50, at 150–51. From 1981 to 1988 the federal debt increased from 
approximately $1 trillion to $2.6 trillion (approximately $2.557 trillion to $5.125 trillion in 2013 
dollars). Historical Debt Outstanding—Annual 1950–1999, TREASURYDIRECT, http://www.treasury
direct.gov/govt/reports/pd/histdebt/histdebt_histo4.htm (last updated May 5, 2013). 
53 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13,202(a)(2), 107 Stat. 312, 
461. 
54 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388, 1388-581 to  
-582 (1990). Under PAYGO, to the extent that a new spending or tax program would decrease 
government revenues, Congress was required to cut another spending program, or to raise taxes. The 
Budget Process: What Is PAYGO?, TAX POL’Y CENTER, URB. INST. & BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, 
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/background/budget-process/paygo.cfm (last updated 
July 12, 2007). 
55 BROWNLEE, supra note 50, at 191. 
56 See BROWNLEE, supra note 50, at 3–5. The top marginal tax rates were as high as 77% in the last 
year of World War I (1914–1918), 79% during the Great Depression, 94% during the last two years of 
World War II (1939–1945), 92% during the last two years of the Korean War (1950–1953), and 91% 
during the Cold War and in the early years of the Vietnam War (1950–1973). U.S. Federal Individual 
Income Tax Rates History, supra note 1. 
57 BANK ET AL., supra note 14, at xvi (“Unwilling to risk domestic achievements, or fearful of 
eroding support for an unpopular war, [U.S. Presidents] have shrunk from the tough decisions that wars 
invariably demand. Eventually, however, they all accepted the hard realities. Whether ardent tribunes of 
fiscal sacrifice (like Franklin Roosevelt) or reluctant champions of fiscal responsibility (like Lyndon 
Johnson), they all accepted the need for some sort of homefront sacrifice, as both an economic and 
moral necessity.”). 
58 Id. at 168. Bank, Stark, and Thorndike suggest that the traditional pay-as-you-go war financing 
was swept aside for three reasons. First, the shift to an all-volunteer armed services force has made war 
less visible to the public and consequently resulted in fewer calls for shared sacrifice than have been 
made in the past. Second, during the early part of the Bush era, Congress pushed to lower top rates as a 
Pigouvian mechanism to encourage economic growth. Bank, Stark, and Thorndike argue that the 
Republican deficit hawks, who would otherwise be concerned about rising deficits, lost political ground 
to the “growth hawks,” Congress members who believed that tax cuts that spurred economic growth 
would ultimately yield higher tax revenues. Third, because the Federal Reserve has used monetary 
policy to keep inflation low, economists have eschewed the use of the income tax to reduce inflation’s 
caustic effects. Id. 
59 The Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 (EGTRRA), Pub. L. No. 107-
16, 115 Stat. 38, reduced taxes significantly, particularly for higher income households. See 115 Stat. at 
41–44. Approximately three months after EGTRRA was signed into law, terrorists attacked the World 
Trade Center and Operation Enduring Freedom was initiated in Afghanistan within a few months 
afterward. BANKS ET AL., supra note 14, at 150–52. While Congress debated suspending or moderating 
the rate reductions under EGTRRA, the tax cuts were implemented without modification. See id. at 153. 
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and it maintained those low rates during the Great Recession.61 Congress 
reversed this course in 2012, restoring the top rate previously in effect 
under the Clinton Administration, 39.6%.62 
An examination of top rates across the 100-year history reveals that 
the rate schedule has flattened over the last thirty years. Currently, top rates 
are significantly lower than both the mean, 59%, and the median, 67% for 
the period.63 At the same time the bottom rates, applied to the first dollars 
of income, have risen and then declined. The bottom tax rates applied to the 
first dollars of taxable income have ranged from a low of 1% in 1913 to a 
high of 23% during World War II. The mean for the initial rate over the 
100-year period is approximately 11.8% and the median is 14%. In 2013, 
the bottom rate on taxable income was 10%.64 
C. Changes in the Zero Bracket  
(the Personal Exemption Plus the Standard Deduction) 
To get a full picture of the rate structures, however, the impact of the 
personal exemption and the standard deduction must be taken into 
account.65 The personal exemption and standard deduction effectively 
impose a zero percentage tax rate on the first dollars of gross income, 
creating a “zero bracket.”66 Figure 5 depicts inflation-adjusted levels for the 
personal exemption and standard deduction for an unmarried individual. 
 
60 In 2003, the U.S. began war on a second front with Operation Iraqi Freedom and within three 
months of the beginning of that war, a second set of tax cuts under the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief 
Reconciliation Act of 2003 (JGTRRA) were signed into law. BANK ET AL., supra note 14, at 153–57. 
JGTRRA authorized rate reductions for each bracket, added a 10% bracket for the first dollars of 
income, and taxed certain dividends at capital gains rates. JGTRRA, Pub. L. No. 108-27, §§ 104–105, 
302(a), 117 Stat. 752, 754–55, 760–64. 
61 U.S. Federal Individual Income Tax Rates History, supra note 1. 
62 American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-240, § 101(b), 126 Stat. 2313, 2316 
(2013). 
63 See U.S. Federal Individual Income Tax Rates History, supra note 1. 
64 Id. 
65 Because approximately 70% of taxpayers do not itemize, the diverse impacts associated with 
claiming itemized deductions and estimating the impacts of § 67 and § 68 on those deductions have not 
been explored. See Harris & Baneman, supra note 15. 
66 Nominal and inflation-adjusted numbers for the personal exemption and standard deduction were 
obtained from the Tax Policy Center. See Historical Individual Income Tax Parameters, supra note 7; 
Historical Standard Deduction, supra note 7. 
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FIGURE 5: INDIVIDUAL PERSONAL EXEMPTION AND  
STANDARD DEDUCTION (IN 2013 DOLLARS) 
 
Initially, at the inception of the income tax in 1913, the personal 
exemption was very large, equal to approximately $70,600 in 2013 dollars. 
A comparison of the exemption to the average and median incomes for that 
period provides additional perspective on the expansiveness of the initial 
exemption. From 1913 through World War II, average incomes in the 
United States ranged between $11,000 and $25,000.67 Average income did 
not reach levels approximating the current level of approximately $50,000 
until the mid-1980s.68 Congress lowered the personal exemption 
significantly at the beginning of World War I from $3000 in 1916 
(approximately $64,100 in 2013 dollars), to $1000 in 1917 (approximately 
$18,200 in 2013 dollars).69 While the personal exemption lost nearly half of 
its value from inflation by 1920, Congress raised the exemption to $1500 
(nearly $20,000 in 2013 dollars) in 1925.70 
 
67 Thomas Piketty & Emmanuel Saez, Income Inequality in the United States, 1913–1998, 118 Q. J. 
ECON. 1, 8–9 (2003) (data updated to 2012 dollars may be found at Tables and Figures Updated to 
2012 in Excel Format, September 2013, Table A0, available at http://elsa.berkeley.edu/~saez/
TabFig2012prel.xls (last visited June 1, 2014)). 
68 Id. at 10. Cf. U.S. Census Bureau, Table H-5, Race and Hispanic Origin of Householder—
Households by Median and Mean Income: 1967 to 2012 (2012), available at http://www.census.gov/
hhes/www/income/data/historical/household/ (identifying the mean household income as $71,274 and 
the median household income in the U.S. as $51,017 for 2012). But see Country Profile, United States, 
UNDATA, http://data.un.org/CountryProfile.aspx?crName=United%20States%20of%20America 
(identifying average income in the United States for 2011 as $47,882, the Gross Domestic Product per 
capita). 
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Throughout the Great Depression, Congress maintained the personal 
exemption at a level roughly between $15,000 and $23,000 in 2013 dollars, 
reducing it significantly only to broaden the tax base during World 
War II.71 Throughout the war, Congress lowered personal exemptions, 
increased rates,72 and imposed a 5% Victory Tax on the first dollars of 
gross income.73 As a greater segment of the population entered the 
workforce during World War II, Congress layered the personal exemption 
with the standard deduction to expand the zero percent rate for the first 
dollars of gross income.74 
The income tax was further transformed from a class tax to a mass tax 
with the mandate for employers to withhold taxes on wages.75 Prior to that 
time, the lack of a broad enforcement mechanism rendered the payment of 
income tax largely voluntary.76 By withholding tax at the income source, 
Treasury could more effectively collect tax from a tax base that had 
expanded significantly during the war.77 This mechanism also increased the 
value of collections; delayed receipts meant reduced receipts because high 
inflation eroded the value of the tax liabilities78 between the time the 
income was earned and the time the tax was collected.79 
 
71 BANK ET AL., supra note 14, at 95. 
72 The United States Revenue Act of 1942, Pub. L. No. 753, 56 Stat. 798, reduced the personal 
exemptions, increased individual income tax rates, and imposed a 5% Victory Tax with a 1.25% rebate 
following the war. 56 Stat. at 802–03, 827–28, 884, 886–87. Roosevelt argued that at a time of national 
crisis, shared sacrifice was needed. See WITTE, supra note 13, at 116. The expansion of the tax base was 
justified by an increase in progressivity. Roosevelt suggested that anyone earning over $25,000 
(approximately $357,300 in 2013 dollars) in income would use that income to purchase unnecessary 
luxury goods. See id. at 116–17. Roosevelt also proposed the enactment of an excess profits tax to 
prevent war profiteering, stating, “not a single war millionaire would be permitted as a result of the war 
disaster.” Id. at 111. 
73 The Revenue Act of 1942 had increased the tax base from 13 million to 28 million taxpayers and 
the Victory Tax broadened the tax base by another 22 million, shifting the tax burden to the lower and 
middle income classes. See WITTE, supra note 13, at 117. 
74 The Individual Income Tax Act of 1944 provided for a percentage standard deduction equal to 
10% of an individual taxpayer’s adjusted gross income, up to a maximum of $500. Individual Income 
Tax Act of 1944, Pub. L. No. 315, § 9, 58 Stat. 231, 236. 
75 Current Tax Payment Act of 1943, Pub. L. No. 78-68, § 1622(a), 57 Stat. 126, 128–37; see 
BANK ET AL., supra note 14, at 103. Withholding mechanisms had been developed to collect Social 
Security and had proven successful. BANK ET AL., supra note 14, at 100. Congress fought against 
Roosevelt’s proposal to grant the government the power to direct employers to withhold taxes at the 
source, however. Id. at 100–03. Ultimately Congress traded authorization to employ withholding (a 
change that would impact lower income wage earners for the indefinite future) for forgiveness of much 
of the tax liability of 1942 (which had been borne primarily by the wealthier classes). Id. 
76 The author owes this insight to Professor Bill Quirk. See BANK ET AL., supra note 14, at 98–99. 
77 Id. at 100. 
78 Between 1941 and 1943, inflation rose by 25%. WITTE, supra note 13, at 120. Shifts to military 
production had reduced the availability of consumer goods and scarcity drove prices upward. Id. at 114. 
Expansion of the military and war production workforce increased income and demand for goods, 
fueling inflation. Id. Congress looked to the income tax as a means to cool demand and slow inflation 
by reducing the amount of cash available for consumption. Id. at 115. By collecting taxes on a broad tax 
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Following World War II through the late 1960s, inflation further 
reduced the aggregate value of the personal exemption and standard 
deduction, which reached an all-time low of approximately $5000 (in 2013 
dollars) in 1963. In 1969, however, Congress gave the standard deduction  
a boost and when combined with the personal exemption, the zero bracket 
was extended to the first $1625 (approximately $10,360 in 2013 dollars) of 
income for an unmarried individual.80 Congress periodically updated the 
standard deduction and personal exemption to maintain this zero bracket 
over the next decade.81 Ironically, while ERTA indexed the brackets for 
inflation in 1981, it did not index the standard deduction and personal 
exemption; these two parameters were finally indexed to inflation with the 
Tax Reform Act of 1986.82 From 1982 to 1986 inflation eroded the value of 
the standard deduction and personal exemption to approximately $7500 (in 
2013 dollars).83 Finally, the Tax Reform Act of 1986 set the standard 
deduction at $2540 and personal exemption at $1900 yielding a zero 
bracket on the first $4440 (or approximately $9100 in 2013 dollars) and 
provided for both parameters to be indexed for inflation.84 From 1986 
forward the standard deduction and personal exemption have together 
maintained a zero bracket set at between $9000 and $11,000 (in 2013 
dollars).85 The mean value for the personal exemption plus the standard 
deduction during the 100-year period is $12,738, and the median is $9804 
(both in 2013 dollars).86 
D. Number of Brackets 
In comparison to prior years, the current income tax system has a 
paucity of brackets. During the first thirty years, the federal income tax 
contained as many as fifty-six brackets, yielding both a greater degree of 
progressivity and more gradual rate increases. The number of brackets has 
ranged as high as fifty-six during the two world wars and as low as three in 
 
base at the time the income was earned, the government reduced consumer purchasing power and 
dampened consumer demand. BANK ET AL., supra note 14, at 99. 
79 BANK ET AL., supra note 14, at 99. 
80 Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, §§ 801–802, 83 Stat. 487, 675–76. 
81 See Historical Individual Income Tax Parameters, supra note 7; Historical Standard Deduction, 
supra note 7. 
82 The Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085, provided for the personal 
exemption and standard deduction to be adjusted for inflation annually. 100 Stat. at 2100–03. 
83 See BROWNLEE, supra note 50, at 133. 
84 The Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085, provided for the personal 
exemption and standard deduction to be adjusted for inflation annually. 100 Stat. at 2100–03. 
85 See Historical Individual Income Tax Parameters, supra note 7; Historical Standard Deduction, 
supra note 7. 
86 See Historical Individual Income Tax Parameters, supra note 7; Historical Standard Deduction, 
supra note 7. 
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1991 and 1992. Figure 6 tracks the number of brackets that have been in 
effect over the full period the income tax has been in place.87 
FIGURE 6: TOTAL NUMBER OF TAX BRACKETS 1913–2013 
 
Prior to World War II, the initial rates levied on taxable income were 
modest. The bottom rates started at 1% to 4%, the rate increases between 
brackets were small (no greater than 4%), and the brackets themselves (the 
traunches of income subject to each rate) were broad. During World 
War II, Congress reduced the number of rates and increased the step up in 
rates between brackets. After the initial rate, set at 23% on the first dollars 
of taxable income, the rate schedule progressed in increments of 1% to 5% 
to the top rate of 94%.88 
In contrast, the Tax Reform Act of 1986 dramatically reduced the 
number of brackets to four, applying only three different rates. The first 
three rates were set at 15%, 28%, and 33%. These rates were applied to 
progressively higher traunches of income up to $176,000 (in 2013 dollars). 
A lower rate of 28% was applied to taxable income in excess of $176,000.89 
The rate structure progressed steeply against middle class taxable income 
and was flat at higher levels. 
In 1992, under President Clinton, Congress expanded the rate structure 
to increase progressivity, setting a top marginal rate at 39.6%.90 In 2001, 
under President George W. Bush, Congress reduced the rates set under 
 
87 See U.S. Federal Income Tax Rates History, supra note 1. 
88 Id. (years 1944 and 1945). 
89 Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA 1986), Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 101, 100 Stat. 2085, 2096–98. 
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President Clinton, bringing the top rate down to 35%, and creating an 
additional 10% bracket for the first dollars of taxable income.91 This rate 
structure has remained in place, with the restoration of a top rate of 39.6% 
in December of 2012.92 
E. Bracket Penetration 
The penetration of the bracket structure into the income stream has 
varied wildly. For the first fifty years of the income tax, the bracket 
structure extended much more deeply into the income strata. During the 
Great Depression and just prior to entry into World War II, the U.S. 
established top rates of 79% and 81% for incomes in excess of $5 million 
(approximately $78–$82 million in 2013 dollars).93 In contrast, in 2013, the 
top marginal rate of 39.6% was applied to taxable income in excess of 
$400,000.94 Figure 7 depicts the income levels at which the top marginal 
rates were applied over the 100-year period.95 
 
91 See Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-27, §§ 104–105, 
117 Stat. 752, 754–55; Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-
16, § 101, 115 Stat. 38, 41–42. 
92 American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-240, § 101(b), 126 Stat. 2313, 2316 
(2013). The Act applies a 10% rate on the first $8925 of taxable income, a 15% rate on the next 
$27,325, a 25% rate on the next $51,600, a 28% rate on the next $94,400, a 33% rate on the next 
$215,100, a 35% rate on the next $1650, and 39.6% on taxable income in excess of $400,000. See U.S. 
Federal Income Tax Rates History, supra note 1. 
93 See U.S. Federal Income Tax Rates History, supra note 1 (years 1940 and 1941). 
94 Id. 
95 See U.S. Federal Income Tax Rates History, supra note 1. 
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FIGURE 7: TOP MARGINAL TAX RATES AND LEVEL OF INCOME  
AT WHICH TOP MARGINAL TAX RATES APPLIED 1913–2013 
 
Congress made dramatic adjustments to the brackets in 1942, applying 
a top rate of 88% to $200,000 of taxable income (approximately $2.86 
million in 2013 dollars).96 While these progressive rate structures remained 
in place for three decades after the end of World War II, inflation 
compressed the rate structures. 
From 1913 to 1981, Congress denominated the brackets, the income 
levels to which different marginal tax rates would apply, in dollar amounts. 
Because Congress did not provide for those sums to be adjusted annually 
for inflation, higher rates were forced onto taxpayers at lower and lower 
levels of income, a phenomenon known as “bracket creep.”97 For example, 
from 1946 through 1963 the rate structure was not altered significantly. In 
1946 the top tax rate, 91%, was levied on taxable income of $200,000 
(approximately $2.39 million in 2013 dollars).98 By 1963 the 91% top rate 
still applied to incomes of $200,000, but those dollars were worth only 
about $1.52 million (in 2013 dollars) because of inflation.99 Similarly, 
between 1964 and 1981 Congress did not amend the rate schedule 
significantly, but inflation continued to take its toll. In 1965, the top 
marginal rate was 70%, applying to incomes of $100,000 (approximately 
$740,000 in 2013 dollars) and higher.100 By 1981, the top bracket was 
 
96 See id. 
97 BROWNLEE, supra note 50, at 126–27. 
98 U.S. Federal Income Tax Rates History, supra note 1. 
99 Id. 
100 Revenue Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-272, § 111(a), 78 Stat. 19, 21; U.S. Federal Income Tax 
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largely unchanged, but the 70% rate applied to taxable incomes of 
approximately $278,000 in 2013 dollars.101 This inflationary shift of top 
rates onto lower levels of income was paralleled in every bracket and 
impacted every taxpayer.102 Each year higher rates were imposed on 
taxpayers at lower levels of income. 
Bracket creep also provided Congress with “easy” money.103 By failing 
to index the brackets to inflation, Congress effectuated an increase in rates 
without having to pass a new tax statute.104 Bracket creep and the erosion of 
earning power also appears to have driven significant demand for tax 
expenditures, preferences in the form of exclusions, exemptions, 
deductions, credits, deferral provisions, and special rates.105 Tax 
expenditures, in turn, gave Congress the means to move their social policy 
goals forward and to provide favorable tax treatment to special interest 
groups without having to go through the budgetary process.106 In 1967, 
Assistant Secretary of the Treasury Stanley Surrey began to assemble a tax 
expenditure budget to identify these forms of “spending” occurring through 
the tax code and to express his concerns about their inefficiency, 
unfairness, growing magnitude, and distortionary impact.107 Under 
President Nixon, Congress introduced the Alternative Minimum Tax to 
attempt to restore vertical equity.108 President Jimmy Carter sought to attack 
the source of the problem, spearheading broad-based tax reform to roll 
back tax preferences for the wealthy, but these efforts failed.109 Between 
 
101 The 70% marginal rate applied to incomes of $108,200 in 1965. U.S. Federal Income Tax Rates 
History, supra note 1. 
102 BROWNLEE, supra note 50, at 133. 
103 See id. at 126–28. Brownlee dubs this period the “era of easy finance.” Id. at 107. 
104 Id. at 133. 
105 Id. at 129–30. Today, the largest tax expenditures for individuals include exclusion of 
employers’ contributions for employee’s health insurance and medical care, the net exclusion of 
contributions to employer-provided and individual pension plans and the deferral of gains under these 
plans, the deductibility of mortgage interest on owner-occupied homes, the exclusion of up to $250,000 
of capital gains on a primary residence (up to $500,000 for a married couple), the deduction of state and 
local property tax for owner-occupied homes, the partially refundable child credit of $1000 per child, 
the deduction for charitable contributions, the reduced tax rate on long-term capital gains, and the step-
up in basis for capital gains at death. For businesses, the largest tax expenditures include the provision 
that allows for accelerated depreciation of certain types of machinery and equipment, and the deferral of 
income from controlled foreign corporations. See Tax Expenditures: What Are the Largest Tax 
Expenditures?, TAX POL’Y CENTER, URB. INST. & BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, http://www.taxpolicy
center.org/briefing-book/background/expenditures/largest.cfm (last visited June 1, 2014). 
106 BROWNLEE, supra note 50, at 129–30. 
107 Id. at 131–32. 
108 See WITTE, supra note 13, at 167. 
109 BROWNLEE, supra note 50, at 147. 
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1967 and 1984 the tax expenditure budget expanded from $37 billion ($258 
billion in 2013 dollars) to $327 billion ($733 billion in 2013 dollars).110 
The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA) brought bracket 
creep to a halt by requiring the tax tables to be adjusted annually for 
inflation based on the Consumer Price Index.111 The progressivity 
maintained during and after World War II was never restored, however. For 
example, in 1981, before ERTA went into effect, the 49% rate was applied 
to incomes between approximately $87,000 and $106,000 in 2013 dollars, 
with higher rates of up to 70% imposed on higher levels of income.112 In 
1982 when ERTA went into effect, the top rate, 50%, was applied to 
incomes of $100,000 (in 2013 dollars) and above.113 In other words, those 
with incomes below $100,000 did not receive a significant reduction in 
rates that year.114 Taxpayers with incomes above $100,000, however, 
received rate reductions of between 5% and 20%.115 
Congress continued to compress the rate structures with the Tax 
Reform Act of 1986; after its initial three-year phase-in period, the rate 
schedule had little progression at all. By 1988, the rate on the highest level 
of income was 28%; it was applied to incomes between $17,850 and 
 
110 Id. at 132. The sums were adjusted for inflation to reflect 2013 dollars based on the average 
CPI-U published by the Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics for each year. See CPI 
Inflation Calculator, supra note 8. 
111 Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 104(a), 95 Stat. 172, 188–89. The provisions for inflation adjustments 
under ERTA and TRA 1986 contained one important exception, the Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT). 
The AMT was developed during the Nixon Administration to ensure that high-income taxpayers were 
not able to avoid paying income tax altogether through the extensive use of exemptions, deductions, and 
credits. WITTE, supra note 13, at 167; see also Tax Reform Act of 1969, sec. 301, §§ 56–58, Pub. L. 
No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487, 580–86; STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATION, 
91ST CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1969, at 105 (Comm. Print 1970). 
The AMT applies a flat rate to a more comprehensive tax base for high-income taxpayers. See 83 Stat. 
at 580–86. While initially the tax was calculated separately and added to the tax calculated using the tax 
tables on ordinary income, the AMT was transformed into a separate, parallel system under the 
Revenue Act of 1978. See Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, sec. 131, § 457, 92 Stat. 2763, 
2781–82; Historical AMT Legislation, TAX POL’Y CENTER, URB. INST. & BROOKINGS INSTITUTION 
(Jan. 6, 2014), http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxfacts/displayafact.cfm?Docid=195. Consequently, a 
taxpayer earning income in excess of the threshold would have to calculate their income tax both under 
the normal system and under the AMT. See I.R.C. § 55 (2006); I.R.C. § 55 (1988). The failure to index 
the AMT for inflation meant that each year more middle class households were subject to the AMT, 
paid a flat rate between 21% and 28% on their incomes, and spent significantly more time calculating 
their total tax burden. In December of 2012, after spending years periodically “patching” the AMT to 
provide relief to middle income households, Congress finally modified the AMT to index the thresholds 
for inflation. See American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-240, §§ 101(a)–(b), 104, 
126 Stat. 2313, 2316–17, 2320 (2013) (codified at I.R.C. § 55(c)(4)). 
112 U.S. Federal Income Tax Rates History, supra note 1. 
113 Id. 
114 At that time, taxes were actually increased for taxpayers earning incomes of less than $99,000 
because the standard deduction and the personal exemption were not indexed for inflation and declined 
in value from 1981 through 1986. 
115 See U.S. Federal Income Tax Rates History, supra note 1. 
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$43,150 (between approximately $35,150 and $85,000 in 2013 dollars) and 
to incomes above $89,560 (approximately $176,000 in 2013 dollars).116 A 
33% bubble rate that applied to incomes between approximately $85,000 
and $175,000 (in 2013 dollars) recouped the benefits provided by the initial 
15% rate. In 1991 and 1992 the top rate was 31% applied to incomes in 
excess of approximately $85,000 in 2013 dollars.117 Figure 8 depicts the 
income levels at which the top marginal rates were applied over the last 
70 years.118 
FIGURE 8: TOP MARGINAL TAX RATES AND  
LEVEL OF INCOME (IN 2013 DOLLARS) AT WHICH TOP MARGINAL  
TAX RATES WERE APPLIED 1943–2013 
 
The sharp changes in the slope of the line in Figure 8 for 1964, 1981, 
1986, and 1992 correspond to tax legislation that modified the brackets and 
the rates. The gradual declines in the slope from 1943 through 1964 and 
from 1965 through 1981 depict the impacts of inflation; higher tax rates 
were increasingly applied to lower levels of income. From 1992 to the 
present, the rate structure has been relatively stable as a result of inflation 
indexing, with the taxable income level at which the top rate has been 
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F. Overview 
The income tax has taken on a diverse array of forms over the past 
100 years. Congress broadened the income tax base dramatically from 1913 
to 1963 and applied sharply progressive rates against higher levels of 
income, reaching deeply into the income strata. To cover the costs of 
military mobilization during World Wars I and II and fiscal needs during 
the Great Depression, Congress expanded the rate schedule to include as 
many as fifty-six different rates ranging from 2% to 94%. These rates were 
applied against income brackets that extended so deeply into the income 
strata that the top rate was applied to income in excess of $83 million (in 
2013 dollars). When the United States entered World War II, Congress 
made the rate structures more steeply progressive, shifting to a twenty-four-
bracket structure and applying the highest rate, 88%, against income in 
excess of $2.8 million in 2013 dollars. During that period, Congress 
brought virtually every household into the ambit of the income tax through 
withholding at the source and a sharp reduction in the personal exemption 
and standard deduction. The lowest income taxpayers were paying a rate of 
23% on their first dollars of taxable income. The executive and legislative 
branch justified this massive transformation toward sharper progressivity 
and a much more expansive base with calls for shared sacrifice. These rate 
structures remained in place for another twenty years. At the end of World 
War II, the executive branch resisted Congressional pressure to lower rates, 
instead emphasizing inflation management, federal debt reduction, 
balanced budgets, and the need to fund domestic programs and military 
engagement in Korea and Vietnam. The primary concerns of tax policy 
analysts throughout this period were efficiency (how best to collect revenue 
without distorting taxpayer behavior), equity (how best to distribute the 
burdens and benefits across the economic classes), and fiscal prudence 
(how to balance the budget and reduce the federal debt). 
During the last fifty years, however, Congress has used the income tax 
as a tool to achieve economic growth, apparently eschewing its earlier 
goals. While the initial tax cuts were designed to increase consumer 
demand, for the past forty years Congress has repeatedly reduced the 
progression of rates and their penetration into the income strata to increase 
the supply of capital. By 1991 the rate schedule had flattened to three rates, 
with the top rate of 31% applied to incomes in excess of $49,300 
(approximately $84,300 in 2013 dollars). While Congress has expanded the 
rate schedule during the Clinton, Bush, and Obama Administrations, the 
progressivity achieved during the first half of the 20th Century has never 
been restored and the federal debt has grown. 
In addition, the structure has become far more opaque. From World 
War II to 1980, inflation reduced the real value of wages and forced lower 
income taxpayers into higher brackets. Lower real income and higher taxes 
increased demand for tax preferences (exemptions, exclusions, deductions, 
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credits, deferral, and special rates) that would help taxpayers shield their 
income. These tax expenditures have proliferated at a rapid pace,120 creating 
more complexity,121 undermining horizontal and vertical equity,122 and 
reducing transparency.123 
II. HISTORICAL ANALOGS TO CURRENT PROPOSALS FOR TAX REFORM 
The great variety of bracket and rate structures employed over the  
100-year history of the income tax renders historical economic data an 
invaluable resource for economists and tax scholars. Because the structures 
that would result from a number of tax proposals currently being discussed 
in the media resemble historical tax structures, analysis of historical data 
may aid tax analysts in evaluating those proposals. 
For example, historical evidence appears to contradict assumptions 
that tax cuts to top incomes will spur growth. The Congressional Research 
Service has noted that the highest periods of economic growth have 
correlated with more highly progressive tax rates.124 Thomas Piketty, 
Facundo Alvaredo, Anthony Atkinson, and Emmanuel Saez have examined 
historical economic data from the United States and other countries 
throughout North America, Europe, Asia, and Australia and concluded that 
countries that cut top income tax rates significantly during the last quarter 
of the 20th Century did not achieve higher growth than countries that 
 
120 Tax Expenditures: How Have They Changed over Time?, TAX POL’Y CENTER, URB. INST. & 
BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/background/expenditures/
change.cfm (last updated July 20, 2009) (describing the increase in tax expenditures as a percentage of 
GDP). 
121 STANLEY S. SURREY & PAUL R. MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES 25–26 (1985). 
122 See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE DISTRIBUTION OF MAJOR TAX EXPENDITURES IN THE 
INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX SYSTEM 8 (2013), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/
attachments/43768_DistributionTaxExpenditures.pdf. In a tax system with progressive rates, 
exclusions, exemptions, and deductions provide an upside-down subsidy, granting larger subsidies to 
higher income taxpayers than to those with lower incomes. Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Incentives as a 
Device for Implementing Government Policy: A Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 
83 HARV. L. REV. 705, 720–22 (1970); see also Leonard E. Burman, Is the Tax Expenditure Concept 
Still Relevant?, 56 NAT’L TAX J. 613, 622 (2003) (describing the size and the distributional impact of 
the home mortgage interest deduction). 
123 STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, JCX-37-08, A RECONSIDERATION OF TAX 
EXPENDITURE ANALYSIS 62–64 (2008). 
124 THOMAS L. HUNGERFORD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42729, TAXES AND THE ECONOMY: AN 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE TOP TAX RATES SINCE 1945 (UPDATED) 10 (2012) (“The fitted values 
[annual real per capita GDP growth rate plotted against the top marginal tax rate and top capital gains 
tax rate] seem to suggest that higher tax rates are associated with slightly higher real per capita GDP 
growth rates. The top marginal tax rate in the 1950s was over 90%, and the real GDP growth rate 
averaged 4.2% and real per capita GDP increased annually by 2.4% in the 1950s. In the 2000s, the top 
marginal tax rate was 35% while the average real GDP growth rate was 1.7% and real per capita GDP 
increased annually by less than 1%.”). 
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maintained progressive income tax regimes.125 Saez and Peter Diamond 
have used historical economic data since World War II to develop models 
of the impacts of income tax rate changes and concluded that imposing 
much more highly progressive rates, such as those in place since 1964, 
during the Johnson Administration,126 and from 1981 to 1986, during the 
Reagan Administration,127 would not dampen economic growth.128  While 
critics claim that increased progressivity would be confiscatory and 
redistributive and that a more equal distribution of income would not be 
acceptable for most U.S. citizens,129 top rates between 50% and 70% have 
not only been common during the 100 years of the income tax, but have 
prevailed during most of its history.130 
Similarly, other reform proposals are mirrored in the bracket and rate 
structures that have been employed in the United States in the past. For 
 
125 Facundo Alvaredo, Anthony B. Atkinson, Thomas Piketty & Emmanuel Saez, The Top 1 
Percent in International and Historical Perspective, J. ECON. PERSP., Summer 2013, at 3, 11; see also 
Thomas Piketty, Emmanuel Saez & Stefanie Stantcheva, Optimal Taxation of Top Labor Incomes: A 
Tale of Three Elasticities, 6 AM. ECON. J.: ECON. POL’Y 230, 232 (2014) (finding no apparent 
correlation between cuts in top tax rates and growth rates in real per capita GDP based on U.S. and 
international data). While the United States and the United Kingdom reduced top rates dramatically 
from 1970 to 2010, real GDP growth per capita did not vary significantly from that of other countries, 
such as France, Germany, and Denmark, that maintained much higher marginal tax rates. Thomas 
Piketty, Emmanuel Saez & Stefanie Stantcheva, Taxing the 1%: Why the Top Tax Rate Could Be over 
80%, VOXEU.ORG (Dec. 8, 2011), http://www.voxeu.org/article/taxing-1-why-top-tax-rate-could-be-
over-80 (“[T]here is no correlation between cuts in top tax rates and average annual real GDP-per-
capita growth since the 1970s. For example, countries that made large cuts in top tax rates such as the 
United Kingdom or the Untied States have not grown significantly faster than countries that did not, 
such as Germany or Denmark.”); see also, Peter Diamond & Emmanuel Saez, Diamond and Saez: High 
Tax Rates Won’t Slow Growth, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 23, 2012, 7:14 PM) [hereinafter Diamond and Saez, 
High Tax Rates], http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303425504577353843997820160.
html (“For example, from 1970 to 2010, real GDP annual growth per capita averaged 1.8% and 2.03% 
in the U.S. and the U.K., both of which dramatically lowered their top tax rates during that period, 
while it averaged 1.72% and 1.89% in France and Germany, which kept high top tax rates during the 
period. While in no way does this prove that higher top tax rates actually encourage growth, there is not 
good evidence from the aggregate data supporting the view that higher tax rates slow growth.”). 
126 From 1965 to 1981, the top marginal rate was 70%, levied initially on taxable income of 
approximately $728,000 (in 2013 dollars) or more. U.S. Federal Income Tax Rates History, supra 
note 1. 
127 From 1982 to 1986, the top marginal rate was 50%, levied initially on taxable income of 
$99,000 (in 2013 dollars). Id. 
128 See Peter Diamond & Emmanuel Saez, The Case for a Progressive Tax: From Basic Research 
to Policy Recommendations, J. ECON. PERSP., Fall 2011, at 165; Diamond & Saez, High Tax Rates, 
supra note 125 (“Indeed, according to the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Economic 
Analysis, GDP annual growth per capita (to adjust for population growth) averaged 1.68% between 
1980 and 2010 when top tax rates were relatively low, while growth averaged 2.23% between 1950 and 
1980 when top tax rates were at above 70%.”). 
129 Aparna Mathur, Sita Slavov & Michael R. Strain, Should the Top Marginal Income Tax Rate Be 
73 Percent?, 137 TAX NOTES 905, 912 (2012). 
130 The mean for the top rate is 59% and the median top rate is 67% for the 100-year period. See 
supra note 63 and accompanying text. 
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example, a recent proposal for reform involves a “millionaire tax,” 
imposing a surtax of 3.25%131 to 5.6%132 on incomes in excess of one 
million dollars. Congress has enacted far more highly progressive rate 
structures in the past. Figure 9 tracks the marginal rates applied to the 
millionth dollar of income over the period the income tax has been in 
effect.133 
FIGURE 9: MARGINAL RATES ON MILLIONTH DOLLAR 
 
The enactment of a 3.25% surtax on incomes in excess of $1 million 
would result in a top marginal rate of 42.85% and a 5.6% surtax would 
result in a top marginal rate of 44.2%134 on taxable income of $1 million or 
more. These rates would be well below the mean and not significantly 
above the median for the 100-year period the income tax has been in 
place.135 The marginal rates that would result from the application of a 
millionaire surtax are not only unremarkable, but are actually more 
common than not. Furthermore, the higher marginal rates do not appear to 
have had an impact on economic growth.136 
 
131 Susy Khimm, Millionaire’s Surtax Would Hit the Top 1 Percent of Small Businesses, WASH. 
POST WONKBLOG (Nov. 29, 2011, 4:07 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/post/
millionaires-surtax-would-hit-the-top-1-percent-of-small-businesses/2011/11/29/gIQAO9de9N_blog.
html. 
132 Janet Hook, Democrats Propose New Tax on Top Earners, WALL ST. J., Oct. 6, 2011, at A5. 
133 See U.S. Federal Income Tax Rates History, supra note 1. 
134 In 2013 the top rate of 39.6% was applied to incomes in excess of $400,000. Id. 
135 The marginal rate on incomes of $1 million has averaged about 52.3%, with a median rate at 
about 42%. See id. 
136 During economic recession periods, the marginal rate on $1 million has been as high as 90% 
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Critics of the millionaire surtax argue that the imposition of the surtax 
would negatively impact employment137 and that the surtax would harm 
small businesses.138 Figure 10 compares the unemployment rate139 to the 
marginal tax rate applied to incomes of $1 million or more140 for the period 
for which unemployment data is available, between 1947 and 2013. 
FIGURE 10: UNEMPLOYMENT RATE AND MARGINAL TAX RATE  
ON $1 MILLION 1947–2013 
 
Unemployment rates do not appear to vary based on changes in the 
marginal tax rates on incomes of $1 million. A closer examination of 
unemployment rates and tax rates for the past three decades, a period in 
 
economic expansion the marginal rate on $1 million has also been as high as 90% and as low as 2%, 
with the mean at 54.3% and the median at 44%. Economic contractions start at the peak of a business 
cycle and end at the trough: January 1913–December 1914, August 1918–March 1919, January 1920–
July 1921, May 1923–July 1924, October 1926–November 1927, August 1929–March 1933, May 
1937–June 1938, February 1945–October 1945, November 1948–October 1949, July 1953–May 1954, 
August 1957–April 1958, April 1960–February 1961, December 1969–November 1970, November 
1973–March 1975, January 1980–July 1980, July 1981–November 1982, July 1990–March 1991, 
March 2001–November 2001, December 2007–June 2009. Economic expansions start at the trough of a 
business cycle and end at the next peak. US Business Cycle Expansions and Contractions, NAT’L 
BUREAU OF ECON. RES., http://www.nber.org/cycles/cyclesmain.html (last visited June 1, 2014). 
137 See Hook, supra note 132. 
138 See Khimm, supra note 131 (noting Congressman John Boehner’s critique of the millionaire tax 
as a “job-killing tax hike on small businesses”). 
139 Labor Force Statistics from the Current Population Survey, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., BUREAU OF 
LAB. STAT., http://data.bls.gov/timeseries/LNU04000000?years_option=all_years&periods_option=
specific_periods&periods=Annual+Data (last visited June 1, 2014) (providing the unadjusted 
unemployment rate from 1947–2013). 
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which Congress has actively used the income tax as a tool to spur growth, 
establishes no clear relationship between the two parameters. Figure 11 
examines more recent data, comparing the unemployment rate141 to the 
marginal tax rate applied to incomes of $1 million or more142 from 1983 to 
2013. 
FIGURE 11: UNEMPLOYMENT RATE AND MARGINAL TAX RATE ON  
$1 MILLION 1983–2013 
 
While unemployment declined from 9.6% to 5.3% during the Reagan 
era, when tax rates on incomes of $1 million were dropped from 50% to 
28%, unemployment declined from 7.5% to 4.0% from 1992 to 2000, when 
the top marginal rate was increased to 39.6%.143 Furthermore, from 2001 to 
2010, when Congress reduced the top marginal tax rate to 35%, 
unemployment steadily rose to the previous high of 9.6%.144 While these 
comparisons are rudimentary, they suggest that there is no clear 
relationship between unemployment and the marginal tax rates applied to 
top incomes. If tax rates do impact employment levels, the relationship 
appears to be obscured, and possibly swamped, by other factors.145 
 
141 See Labor Force Statistics from the Current Population Survey, supra note 139. 
142 See U.S. Federal Income Tax Rates History, supra note 1. 
143 Labor Force Statistics from the Current Population Survey, supra note 139; U.S. Federal 
Income Tax Rates History, supra note 1. 
144 Labor Force Statistics from the Current Population Survey, supra note 139; U.S. Federal 
Income Tax Rates History, supra note 1. 
145 Other factors impacting unemployment during this period include rising inequality, wage 
stagnation, inflation and monetary policy, globalization of trade, and offshoring of jobs. See JOSEPH E. 
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Concern about the impact of the income tax on small businesses has 
arisen from a belief that small businesses drive new job growth. 146 The 
most recent economic literature suggests, however, that it is not small 
businesses, but new businesses, startup enterprises, that are responsible for 
private sector job creation.147 Existing research on the impacts of tax on 
small business entry and exit provides little guidance on how tax might 
impact entrepreneurship, unfortunately.148 Note that the only startups 
directly impacted by a millionaire surtax would be those generating 
incomes in excess of $1 million during the first year of operation, the 
period in which they are net job creators.149 Given that startups are not 
generally profitable for their first several years,150 they would not likely feel 
any direct impacts from a millionaire surtax. If concerns about enacting a 
millionaire surtax are based on fears that job growth will be slowed, then 
research should be focused on the factors that impact the development of 
startup enterprises.151 
CONCLUSION: A RESEARCH AGENDA 
During the first fifty years the income tax has been in effect, the 
primary concerns of policymakers were efficiency (how best to collect 
revenue without distorting taxpayer behavior), equity (how best to 
 
85, 238–40 (2012) (describing the rise in unemployment from a decline in aggregate demand and 
tracing that decline to reduced consumption from wage stagnation, increasing inequality, and monetary 
policies to keep inflation low); see also LINDA LEVINE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32292, 
OFFSHORING (OR OFFSHORE OUTSOURCING) AND JOB LOSS AMONG U.S. WORKERS (2012), available 
at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL32292.pdf (describing rising worker displacement from changing 
technology, globalization, and outsourcing of labor to offshore companies). 
146 TIM KANE, KAUFFMAN FOUND., THE IMPORTANCE OF STARTUPS IN JOB CREATION AND JOB 
DESTRUCTION 6 (2010), available at http://www.kauffman.org/what-we-do/research/firm-formation-
and-growth-series/the-importance-of-startups-in-job-creation-and-job-destruction. 
147 John C. Haltiwanger, Ron S. Jarmin & Javier Miranda, Who Creates Jobs, Small vs. Large vs. 
Young 28–29 (NBER Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 16300, 2010), available at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w16300.pdf (“Firms that are over 10 years old and have more than 500 
workers account for about 45 percent of all jobs in the U.S. private sector. In turn, we show that these 
large, mature firms account for almost 40 percent of job creation and destruction. The share of jobs 
created and destroyed by different groups of firms is roughly their share of total employment. An 
important exception in this context is the contribution of firm startups. Firm startups account for only 3 
percent of employment but almost 20 percent of gross job creation.”). 
148 WILLIAM GALE & SAMUEL BROWN, SMALL BUSINESS, INNOVATION AND TAX POLICY: A 
REVIEW 29–33 (2013), available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2013/04/
small%20business%20tax%20policy%20gale/small%20business%20tax%20policy%20gale.pdf. 
149 KANE, supra note 146, at 5 (“A closer analysis presented here indicates that net job growth in 
the United States comes from firms less than one year old, formally defined as startups. Since the 
[Business Dynamics Statistics] uses annualized data, . . . it stands to reason that the [transition from 
when the number of jobs created equals the number destroyed occurs] at the three- to nine-month point 
after firm founding.”). 
150 GALE & BROWN, supra note 148, at 33. 
151 See, e.g., id. at 29–33; Haltiwanger et al., supra note 147. 
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distribute the burdens and benefits across the economic classes), and fiscal 
restraint (how best to balance the budget and reduce the federal debt). Since 
1964, however, the income tax has increasingly been used as a Pigouvian 
tool to spur economic growth. Efficiency has been pursued at the expense 
of equity,152 as well as fiscal prudence. Whether this is an appropriate trade-
off depends on whether the income tax is an effective mechanism for 
producing growth. This was the key question in 1964153 and it remains a 
key question today. Unfortunately, most tax policy analysis is not directed 
to answering this question. 
A number of economists have taken issue with the way tax policy 
analysis is performed, arguing that too often it is incomplete.154 To 
determine whether the government should take an action, policymakers 
frequently employ cost–benefit analysis, which requires them to evaluate 
the benefits and costs associated with taking an action and weigh them 
against the benefits and costs of not taking the action.155 Typically, on 
matters of tax policy, however, once economists have argued that a tax 
policy action will have costs, the analysis ends.156 The actual efficiency 
 
152 See Emmanuel Saez, Striking It Richer: The Evolution of Top Incomes in the United States 
(Updated with 2012 Preliminary Estimates) (Sept. 3, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://elsa.berkeley.edu/~saez/. Professor Saez’s manuscript is an update to an article by the same title 
published in 2008. See Emmanuel Saez, Striking It Richer: The Evolution of Top Incomes in the United 
States, PATHWAYS, Winter 2008, at 6, available at https://www.stanford.edu/group/scspi/_media/pdf/
pathways/winter_2008/Saez.pdf. 
153 When the Kennedy Administration proposed lower rates to spur demand and stimulate a 
flagging economy, Richard Musgrave, a Harvard economist and tax policy advisor, cautioned that “any 
departure from equity must have clear justification in terms of probable effectiveness with regard to 
growth.” WITTE, supra note 13, at 159. 
154 See, e.g., Neil H. Buchanan, What Is Wrong with Incomplete Tax Policy Analysis, DORF ON 
LAW (Mar. 22, 2012, 1:08 PM), http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2012/03/what-is-wrong-with-incomplete-
tax.html; Paul Krugman, Too Much Faith in Models, Capital Taxation Edition, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 27, 
2014, 2:05 PM), http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/03/27/too-much-faith-in-models-capital-
taxation-edition/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0 (“[T]he case for zero or low taxation of capital income 
rests on very strong, very unrealistic assumptions—basically perfectly rational intertemporally 
optimizing agents, with dynasties behaving as if they were infinitely lived individuals. Question those 
assumptions, and the whole case falls apart. Don’t take my word for it—read Peter Diamond and 
Emmanuel Saez, who also point out that the intertemporal optimizing model of saving is in fact rejected 
by lots of evidence. . . . [T]he economic case for not taxing capital rests on a stylized model that we 
know does a bad job of capturing real behavior; the case for taxing capital rests on considerations of 
equity and concerns about excessive concentration of wealth that are very much grounded in real world 
observation.”); see also THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 32 (Arthur 
Goldhammer trans., 2014) (“To put it bluntly, the discipline of economics has yet to get over its 
childish passion for mathematics and for purely theoretical and often highly ideological speculation, at 
the expense of historical research and collaboration with the other social sciences. Economists are all 
too often preoccupied with petty mathematical problems of interest only to themselves. This obsession 
with mathematics is an easy way of acquiring the appearance of scientificity without having to answer 
the far more complex questions posed by the world we live in.”). 
155 JONATHAN GRUBER, PUBLIC FINANCE AND PUBLIC POLICY 206 (3d ed. 2011). 
156 Id. Buchanan suggests training, and, ironically, the incentive structures are what have caused 
economists to falter in making reliable economic predictions, such as the financial crisis that led to the 
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losses in employing a tax are not calculated, the value of the governmental 
activity that tax buys is not evaluated, and the direct effects, the current and 
future costs of maintaining the status quo, are not assessed.157 While during 
most of the 20th Century the dearth of economic data made empirical 
research challenging, if not impossible,158 today robust data sets are 
available159 and technological advances facilitate their analysis.160 It is 
incumbent on tax policy analysts to examine existing data, to provide 
explanations for deviations from expected outcomes, and to evaluate policy 
failures. Only by examining historical data, evaluating the actual 
performance of predictive models, and incorporating lessons learned, can 
tax scholars enhance their capacity to predict economic outcomes. 
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